Interim Relief Under Section 9(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 : Does Non-Commencement of Arbitration Within Ninety Days Automatically Vacate Interim Protection?

Introduction : Interim measures under Section-9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961 are significant in safeguarding the interests of the parties concerned during the pre-arbitration stage or during the arbitration proceedings. This is because the parties involved in a commercial dispute usually seek assistance from the court when they need urgent protection regarding their assets, for keeping the matters in status quo, or avoiding any irreparable damage till the date of arbitration. In order to avoid misuse of this provision by parties, the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 formulated the Section 9(2) which states that the arbitration proceedings should commence within 90 days from the date of the court order unless further time is allowed by the court.

Though this provision seems to be simple, the enforcement of this rule gives rise to an essential question regarding the expiry of the 90 - day period. Do the arbitral courts continue to apply the interim protection in light of the circumstances of each individual case, or does the expiration of the 90-day term cease the provision altogether? This leads to different approaches among the High Courts and leaves the ambiguity concerning the meaning of Section 9(2). The recent ruling of the Supreme Court in Regenta Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Hotel Grand Centre Point & Ors. clarifies what is meant by the initiation of arbitral proceedings and whether interim relief can continue beyond a period of ninety days.

This blog thus discusses the statutory scheme of Section 9(2) as well as the conflicting judicial interpretations on the law and the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Regenta Hotels. It further examines the way courts have balanced procedural timelines with the need to provide effective interim relief and concludes with the practical implications of the judgment for applicants under Section 9.

Legal Provisions

Before consideration of the judicial construction of the ninety-day time limit, it is necessary to outline the statutory provisions relating to interim measures in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Section 9 allows a court to grant interim measures before arbitral proceedings begin, during the proceedings, and even after the award is passed until it is enforced. The provision is meant to protect the parties when urgent relief is required, such as preserving the subject matter of the dispute or preventing irreparable harm, until the arbitral tribunal is in a position to grant appropriate relief.

The powers of the court under Section 9 are quite broad. Depending on the facts of the case, it may grant an interim injunction, order the preservation, custody, or inspection of property, secure the amount in dispute, appoint a receiver, or pass any other interim order that is necessary. The nature of the relief ultimately depends on the circumstances of each case.

The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 made a noteworthy change by introducing Section 9(2). This section clarifies that if a court provides interim protection before arbitration begins, the party that benefits from this relief is required to start the arbitration proceedings within ninety days of the court's order, unless the court grants an extension. The purpose of this amendment was to ensure that parties don’t take advantage of interim relief from the court and then delay the arbitration process.

Although the amendment was made, Section 9(2) still doesn’t clarify two significant questions .First, it did not specify the consequences of failing to commence arbitral proceedings within the prescribed ninety-day period. Second, although it required the commencement of arbitration within that period, it did not explain what "commencement of arbitration" actually meant. This lack of clarity led to different interpretations by the courts and created uncertainty in the application of the provision.

Case Laws

The introduction of Section 9(2) also raised questions about how the ninety-day requirement should be interpreted. The courts addressed these questions in a number of cases, gradually bringing clarity to the provision.

In Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC (India) Ltd,5 Although the decision was made before the enactment of Section 9(2), the case laid out the essential rules concerning interim remedies under Section 9. According to the judgment of the Supreme Court of India, the courts can grant interim remedies prior to the commencement of arbitration proceedings. At the same time, the court stated that interim relief is aimed at enabling arbitration rather than acting as a separate remedy. A party that received interim relief should make an effort to commence arbitration within a certain time.

After the enactment of the 2015 amendment, the interpretation of the rule of ninety days by High Courts was inconsistent. In M/s Paton Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Lorven Projects Ltd. case, the Karnataka High Court strictly interpreted section 9(2) and stated that the use of the word “shall” meant that it was mandatory to follow the period of ninety days. Thus, if arbitration is not initiated within ninety days of the interim order or the extended time given by the court, then it would put an end to the protection granted by the interim order without assessing the reasons for the delay.

The Madras High Court adopted a different approach in Archer Power Systems (P) Ltd. v. Kohli Ventures Ltd. Instead of treating the expiry of the ninety-day period as automatically bringing interim protection to an end, the Court examined whether the applicant had shown a genuine intention to commence arbitration. The Court highlighted the fact that Section 9 permits a party to request relief before the arbitration process begins, but this does not translate into a possibility of delaying arbitration. In this case, the applicant did not take any major steps towards commencing arbitration and approached the court just one day prior to questioning the order of withdrawal of interim relief. Thus, based on the aforementioned facts, the Court rejected the petition. This decision demonstrates that while the requirement of ninety days is not of an absolute nature, a party cannot stay inactive for too long and hope for protection from the court.

Another important question was what "commencement" means for the purpose of Section 9(2). The Supreme Court answered this in Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala. It held that, under Section 21, arbitral proceedings commence when the respondent receives the notice invoking arbitration. The Court also noted that Section 21 determines the date on which arbitral proceedings begin, particularly for the purpose of limitation.

The case of Regenta Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Hotel Grand Centre Point & Ors., indicates the relevance of this interpretation. The Supreme Court analyzed Section 9(2) in this case, since the ad interim stay order was granted on 17 February 2024, the statutory period of ninety days stood completed on 17 May 2024 Just before that, the appellant initiated the arbitration process by giving notices under Section 21 on April 11, 2024, which the respondent received on April 23, 2024. However, the High Court concluded that the requirement of ninety days was not satisfied, as the appellant did not file a Section - application to appoint an arbitrator in that period. Therefore, it concluded that the protection under Section 9 was no longer available.

The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the High Court. It held that, for the purposes of Section 9(2), arbitral proceedings commence when the respondent receives a notice invoking arbitration under Section - 21. This means that the filing of a Section - 11 application or the appointment of an arbitrator has no bearing on whether the ninety-day requirement has been met. The Court noted that the appointment of an arbitrator often depends on factors beyond the applicant's control and cannot, therefore, be treated as an additional requirement under the Act. As the appellant had invoked arbitration within the prescribed period by issuing a notice under Section - 21, the interim injunction was restored. The Court further clarified that the expiry of the ninety-day period, by itself, does not automatically bring interim protection to an end.

Legal Analysis

Interpretation by the Supreme Court in the case of Regenta Hotels is in line with the legislative aim of inserting subsection 9(2). The provision was brought into force by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 with a view to ensure that the interim protection received by the court should be subsidiary to arbitration and not treated as an independent remedy. Before the amendment, parties would take interim orders under Section 9 and would postpone or refrain from initiating proceedings so that they continue to enjoy the protection ordered by the court. The idea behind inserting subsection 9(2) was to check on this misuse since the parties would need to commence the arbitration proceedings within 90 days or within such time as the court wishes.

Section 9(2) should not be read in isolation but as part of the scheme of the Act. While the provision requires parties to commence arbitration within the prescribed period, it does not say that interim protection automatically lapses after ninety days. If Parliament had intended such an outcome, it would have made its intention clear. Any other interpretation would be unfairly prejudicial towards any party that has taken all necessary steps to commence arbitration yet is still waiting for tribunals to be set up due to reasons beyond its control. This would also negate the purpose of interim relief, which is preserving the subject matter of the dispute until its resolution by the tribunal.

An important aspect of the ruling involves the interpretation of Section 9(2) with respect to Section 21 of the law. The judgement held that commencement of arbitration proceedings arises upon service of notice invoking arbitration. The interpretation reconciles the two sections and also resolves the conflicting interpretation by the various courts. The Court further points out that while the applicant can give the notice invoking arbitration as per Section 21, it does not have the complete control concerning the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Since delays may take place due to forces outside the control of the applicant, it would be unfair if the continuance of interim relief is made dependent on the constitution of the tribunal since that would defeat the purpose of Section 9.

The judgment does not relax the requirement under Section 9(2). Parties are still expected to commence arbitral proceedings within the prescribed time. The Court only clarifies that compliance should be determined based on the Act itself and not on additional procedural requirements. This ensures that a party which has acted within time does not lose interim protection because of delays beyond its control.

Practical Implications

The Regenta Hotels judgment by the Supreme Court of India has a direct impact on the process of obtaining interim relief under Section 9. With the pronouncement that it is a reference to Section 21 that indicates the start of arbitral proceedings, many confusions regarding the compliance of the ninety-day time period are resolved. Now the focus shifts to whether or not a party itself has initiated the arbitration proceedings instead of procedural developments that are beyond its control such as formation of the arbitral tribunal.

What this means for parties is that getting an order of interim protection under Section 9 is just the start of the arbitral process. After getting the interim protection, it is upon the parties to follow-up with the next steps in a timely manner. The issue of the notice under Section 21 becomes important since it is through this action that we determine whether a party meets the requirement under Section 9(2). Documentation of the notice and its service also has great significance since it can be challenged in future.

While Regenta Hotels protects parties from being denied interim relief simply because there is no arbitrator appointed.It nevertheless does not justify delay after arbitration has been initiated. Courts may still scrutinize the actions of the applicant when deciding on continuation of interim protection. A party who has sent out a notice under Section 21 and then done nothing may find it hard to prove that the interim relief sought is for the purpose of arbitration as opposed to being an end in itself. The ruling reinforces that parties should act diligently throughout the arbitral process.

The timeline below outlines the key steps in the process :

• Within the first 30–45 days: deliver a notice of arbitration under Section 21 of the Act and retain the notice of delivery.

• If the appointment of an arbitrator does not happen: approach appropriate court under Section 11 without any delays.

• After the tribunal is constituted: promptly file the statement of claim and act while ensuring that all deadlines in accordance with Section 43 are met.

• Throughout the process: make sure to keep all correspondence pertaining to the initiation of arbitration and subsequent procedural steps.

This approach ensures compliance with Section 9(2) while showing that the party has acted diligent.

Conclusion

The interpretation of Section 9(2) is transformed significantly, one of the major reasons for this change is the Supreme Court’s decision in Regenta Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Hotel Grand Centre Point & Ors. The Hon’ble Court has explained through this decision that the intention behind Section 9(2) is not to create a technical procedural hurdle but to ensure that the parties that seek interim relief duly start arbitration proceedings within a reasonable time frame. Since the initiation of arbitration is connected to Section 21, the Supreme Court has brought a sufficient degree of clarity in a field where conflicting views resulted in severe difficulties for litigators

What is equally important in this context is that the judgement tried to find a balance between two extremes: on one hand, parties would not benefit from interim relief for an unlimited time while ignoring their obligation to take part in arbitration and, on the other hand, it provided that the provision cannot be just viewed mechanically so that the interim relief would end automatically after ninety days. The ruling further acts as a reminder for businesses and practitioners that getting temporary relief is just the start of the process. It is further necessary for the party to act in good faith and without delay in pursuing arbitration. The case of Regenta Hotels answers an important legal question and demonstrates that interim measures serve to help in the arbitration process rather than serve a final purpose.

Author: Harshita Lalwani in case of any queries please contact/write back to us via email to content@khuranaandkhurana.com or at  Khurana & Khurana, Advocates and IP Attorney.

Endnotes

1. Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 9 (India).

2. Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act 2015, s 4 (India) (inserting s 9(2) into the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996).

3. Regenta Hotels (P) Ltd v Hotel Grand Centre Point & Ors, 2026 INSC 32 (India).

4. Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 21 (India).

5. Sundaram Finance Ltd v NEPC India Ltd, (1999) 2 SCC 479 (India).

6. M/s Paton Constructions Pvt Ltd v M/s Lorven Projects Ltd, AIR 2017 Kar 135 (India).

7. Archer Power Systems (P) Ltd v Kohli Ventures Ltd, 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 36458 (India).

8. Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd v State of Kerala, 2026 INSC 4 (India).

9. Regenta Hotels (P) Ltd v Hotel Grand Centre Point & Ors, 2026 INSC 32, paras 25–30 (India).

10. Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 11 (India).

11. Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 43, read with the Limitation Act 1963 (India).