FRAND Licensing Dynamics in Southeast Asia 2025: SEP Battlegrounds and Policy Responses

Introduction: The Evolving Role of FRAND in Southeast Asia’s Tech Landscape

The Changing FRAND Side of the Southeast Asian tech picture. While in specific cases, Standard Essential Patents (SEP) and Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) licensing are just another element of the intellectual property arena, they are indispensable pieces of the rapidly evolving digital economy in Southeast Asia. FRAND can be viewed to as an effort at striking a balance between innovation encouragement and accessibility of technology on a broad scale. There are patents that are essential for the adoption of technical standards, such as 5G, that falls into the category of SEPs, and their patent holders must license them on FRAND terms in order to avoid creating a monopoly barrier to adoption.

With expectations that 5G will contribute at least USD 13 billion to the region’s GDP by 2030, the interpretations of FRAND are increasingly important in framing the technology landscape. This piece reviews 2025 developments in Indonesia and Thailand as they align themselves with international standards, particularly Huawei v. ZTE, whether progress is consistent with the tech transfer of 5G technologies and the degree that the region’s collaborative licensing practices compare to China’s more aggressive SEP strategy. In total, these trends provide Southeast Asia as significant SEP litigation venue, while the region moves from near the periphery toward the center of the phase of global tech competition.

FRAND Interpretations in Indonesia and Thailand: 2025 Developments

In 2025, Indonesia and Thailand adopted significant FRAND interpretations, drawing heavily from the European Huawei v. ZTE framework, which prioritizes good-faith negotiations instead of resorting to injunctions.

In Indonesia, although no SEP case law has yet been established, ongoing patent infringement proceedings signal a gradual move toward patent-focused adjudication in commercial courts. Amendments to the Patent Law highlight FRAND as a legal defense by defining fair according to international standards and defining non-discriminatory as providing domestic implementers with equivalent access. This is further validated and syntactically tied with the Indonesian Anti-Monopoly Law, which states that IP agreements (including FRAND agreements) are specifically excluded from antitrust law. The Anti-Monopoly law, distinct from the Patent Law, permits courts to focus on FRAND contractual obligations over competition concerns.

Since 1997, Thailand has had its Intellectual Property and International Trade (IP&IT) Court and has now also adopted the tenets of Huawei v. ZTE.  In 2025, the Department of Intellectual Property issued guidance that mandates those holding SEPs to make any licensing proposals in a format that includes royalties based on what is termed the “smallest saleable patent-practicing unit”. Meanwhile, as the 2017 Competition Act does not discuss SEPs specifically, each case is made on its own merits, with royalties set comparatively.  While these guidelines are not based on landmark judgments, it is anticipated that there will be more disputes, as highlighted by the growth of SEP filings corresponding to the rollout of 5G in the region.  The framework will give clearer paths for the flow of technology, with FRAND to assure access to critical technology.

Impacts on 5G Technology Transfers, Comparative Advantages, and ASEAN Harmonization Challenges

Facilitating 5G Transfers in Indonesia and Thailand

Licensing frameworks in Indonesia and Thailand are key drivers of global 5G technology transfer. Under Indonesian law, IP licenses are excluded from antitrust scrutiny so that SEP owners can charge royalties without penalty by competition law. This will prompt international companies to license critical IP to domestic businesses, facilitate innovation, and insert supply chains into the global economy. Such corporate actors as Sony should, though, show the entertainment of compliance through the disclosure of portfolio-based rates before litigation is actually commenced in accordance with the principles declared by the legal court, i.e. in Huawei v. ZTE. The relevance of this systemic perspective in relation to the 5G market of Indonesia is indicated with the projected value of USD 2.5 billion by 2027 given that such reduction litigations will support the transfer of knowledge to global corporations including Ericsson alongside local partners.

In Thailand, the judiciary’s adherence to open FRAND processes reduces the threat of SEP "hold-up," avoiding charge-ahead fees by license holders subsequent to standard adoption. Reasonable benchmarks for royalties, usually 4–5 percent for 5G, allow local telecom companies to obtain technology at low cost. Success is attested by a 15 percent increase in 5G patent licensing deals in Southeast Asia in 2025, compared to lackluster action in countries with less transparent guidelines. All of these innovations support the idea that well-designed FRAND frameworks create cooperation, reduce disputes, thereby enhancing foreign investment and triggering digital growth, thus affirming the emerging role in establishing the region as a 5G innovation center.

Advantages over China’s Aggressive SEP Policies

Although the more aggressive policy approach of China might have a certain political

downside, the cooperative orientation in Southeast Asia offers a better strategic advantage. Chinese courts are becoming more aggressive in asserting jurisdiction and establishing global FRAND rates, with rates of royalty capable of being set without the agreement of all parties to the agreement, as the Oppo v. Nokia case demonstrates (2023–24). If a previous partnership created a licensing royalty of 4%, separate Chinese cases showed the rate of royalty in international cases with lower GDP was set by the court 61% lower. Courts, in these circumstances, also utilize anti-anti-suit injunctions to limit parallel action. The Chinese response, all consistent with an eight-point development plan including national initiatives such as "Made in China 2025," which promotes self-reliance, is somewhat troubling to some parties, including within the WTO framework.

These militaristic actions have deterred foreign SEP owners, as evidenced by the 20 percent decrease in SEP filings in China since 2023. In contrast, Southeast Asia’s comparatively benign setting that depends on specialized patent courts instead of competition authorities has enabled firms like Nokia to enter constructively and negotiate. This trust-based approach easily builds regional innovation ecosystems and avoids the hostile dynamics seen in China.

ASEAN’s Incomplete Harmonization Efforts

While the national aspect has progressed, regional harmonisation in ASEAN remains limited. The ASEAN IPR Action Plan which aimed to develop a harmonized IP regime meant to standardize terminology (FRAND or ideally normative principles) and other provisions of standards with respect to SEPs between 2021 and 2025, but by 2025, not much had happened in terms of standardizing terminology, legal regime notwithstanding. On top of that, there are substantive differences between the legal regimes. For example, Indonesia allows for IP agreements to not be subject to antitrust review, or in contrast, Singapore does review IP agreements for competition law purposes. Translation: a royalty inconsistency of 10 – 15 % considering the same technology, depending on the legal system, because the licensing area encourages forum shopping to take advantage of the differences, and thus, inefficiencies.

National priorities also hinder harmonization. Thailand is focused on protecting domestic SMEs, Vietnam is establishing SEP compliance through IP courts, and the Philippines is following U.S.-Style proposals. However, with no enforceable mechanisms on an ASEAN-wide basis, the region’s bargaining leverage relevant to global SEP disputes will remain limited.  

Conclusion: Toward a Balanced SEP Future in Southeast Asia

In 2025, Indonesia and Thailand established Southeast Asia as a key SEP hub in the region, utilizing FRAND frameworks in pursuit of technology transfer and local innovation. Whereas ASEAN harmonization has been customarily limited and sometimes to nation-specific needs, the bargaining potential of the consortium has grown. By the member states adopting harmonized practices that would both account for and represent national interests, negotiations would become simpler, lawsuits would be reduced, and more robust innovation agenda could be achieved, even before the implementation of 5G.

Author: Amrita Pradhan, in case of any queries please contact/write back to us via email to chhavi@khuranaandkhurana.com or at  Khurana & Khurana, Advocates and IP Attorney.

References

1.     Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. Co. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.R. I-477 (July 16, 2015).

2.     Law No. 13 of 2016 on Patents (Indon.), https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/legislation/details/16392.

3.     Law No. 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition (Indon.), https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/legislation/details/6173.

4.     The Protection of Intellectual Property and International Trade Act, B.E. 2540 (1997) (Thailand), https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/legislation/details/8910.

5.     Competition Act, B.E. 2560 (2017) (Thailand), https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/legislation/details/22229.

6.     See Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 479, 481-85 (2015).

7.     GSMA, The Mobile Economy Asia Pacific 2024 18-22 (2024), https://www.gsma.com/solutions-and-impact/connectivity-for-good/mobile-economy/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GSMA_Mobile-Economy-Asia-Pacific_2024.pdf.

8.     Oppo Guangdong Mobile Telecomm. Co. v. Nokia Shanghai Bell Co., Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Ct., Case No. (2020) Yue 03 Zhi Min Chu 689 (China) (decision dated Dec. 23, 2023).

9.     ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Action Plan 2021-2025, ASEAN (Dec. 2020), https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/ASEAN-IPR-Action-Plan-2021-2025.pdf.

10.  Mark Cohen, China’s Approach to Standard Essential Patents and FRAND: Domestic Policy Goals and International Implications, 50 GEO. J. INT’L L. 963, 968-74 (2019).